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1. INTRODUCTION 
Abraham Robinson, the famous inventor of nonstandard analysis, once as- 
serted that “from the XVII to the XIX century the history of the Philosophy of 
Mathematics is largely identical with the history of the foundations of the calcu- 
lus” [Robinson 1966, 2801. 
Unfortunately, the subject of the foundation of the calculus-especially for the 
beginning of the 18th century- has been neglected. For example, there is no 
complete history of the long debate among Leibniz, Hermann, and Nieuwentijt 
[I]. Even less attention has been given, especially in English-speaking countries, 
to the debate that occupied the Parisian Academy of Sciences from 1700 to 1706. 
Previous treatments [Costabel 1965; Fleckenstein 1948; Montucla 1802; Sergescu 
1938, 1942; Blay 19861 have in general emphasized specific aspects of the debate 
and, with the exception of [Blay 19861, have ignored the foundational aspects of 
the debate [2]. 
The history of the last-mentioned debate is the subject of my paper. This de- 
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bate-which involved savants like Leibniz, Fontenelle, Malebranche, Varignon, 
Johann (I) Bernoulli, Rolle, l’Hopita1, and a number of other less-known academi- 
cians -is important for several reasons. I mention two of these reasons below: 
(a) the end of the debate among the academicians decreed the complete victory 
of the infinitesimal calculus in France; 
(b) the attacks by Rolle against the “metaphysics of the calculus” had both 
philosophical and mathematical significance. 
2. THE SPREAD OF THE DIFFERENTIAL CALCULUS IN FRANCE 
In 1696 the Marquis de l’Hopita1 published the first textbook on the differential 
calculus on the continent: Analyst des injGtime,nt petits pour I’intelligence des 
lignes courbes. In the eulogy of l’H6pital read in 1704 Fontenelle asserted that 
until the publication of the Ancrlyse des injniment petits “la Geometric des Infini- 
ment petits n’etoit encore qu’une espece de Mystere, &, pour ainsi-dire, une 
Science Cabalistique renfermee entre cinq, ou six personnes” [Fontenelle 1704, 
1311 [3]. Fontenelle was certainly thinking of Leibniz, Newton, the Bernoulli 
brothers, Varignon, and l’Hopita1. 
In 1684 Leibniz published his first memoir on the new calculus, the “Nova 
methodus . . .” in the Acto Eruditorrfm. By 1687 the Bernoulli brothers were 
already in full command of the differential calculus and major parts of the integral 
calculus, (The geometric version of the fluxional calculus, i.e., the method of 
prime and last ratios, made its appearance also in 1687 in Newton’s Principicr.) 
Through the teaching of Johann (I) Bernoulli a group of French mathematicians, 
centered around the charismatic figure Malebranche, came in contact with the 
new calculus around 1690. This group included l’Hopita1, Varignon, Montmort, 
Cart-e, Reyneau, and other less famous mathematicians. In the winter of 1691- 
1692 Johann (I) Bernoulli initiated the Marquis de l’H8pital in the most remote 
secrets of the differential and integral calculus. Bernoulli’s lectures were instru- 
mental in later enabling I’HGpital to write the Analyse des in$niment petits. This 
textbook had a remarkable success and for quite a long time represented the only 
accessible road to the differential calculus. 
Various French scholars, Robinet [1960] and Costabel (in [Malebranche 195% 
1968 XVII-2]), have documented the intense activity and collective effort of the 
group led by Malebranche to come to a full understanding of the new infinitesimal 
techniques. Malebranche himself had studied the calculus deeply and was, in 
effect, the main patron of the “infinitesimalist revolution” in the Academy of 
Sciences. When the academy was renewed in 1699 a number of new places were 
opened and Malebranche was elected an honorary member. In the following few 
years the academy came to include a compact group of “infinitesimalists,” among 
them Carre, Saurin, Guisnee, and Montmort. This group was under the technical 
guidance of l’HBpita1 and Varignon, who were older academicians [4]. 
The presence within the academy of a group of mathematicians (including 
Rolle, Ph. de la Hire, and Galloys), who were decidedly adverse to the new 
calculus, created an explosive situation [5]. From 1700 to 1706 the academy was 
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divided over the admissibility of the new techniques: on one side stood the infini- 
tesimalist group characterized by its total adherence to the new Leibnizian calcu- 
lus in the version codified by l’H6pital and in general by a commitment to the 
existence of infinitesimal quantities; on the other side was the finitist faction 
characterized by a refusal to give a rigorous status to infinitesimal considerations 
and by a general adherence to classical techniques. 
Since the debate centered on the logical admissibility of the differential calculus 
given in I’Hopital’s textbook, it is important to sketch the structure of the book. 
3. THESTRUCTURE OF THE ANALYSE DES ZNFZNZMENT PETIT3 
In the first two definitions I’Hopital characterized the basic primitives of the 
theory: 
DBFINITXON I. On appelle quantitks variables celles qui augmentent ou diminuent conti- 
nuellement ; & au contraire quantitCs constantes celles qui demeurent les mCmes pendant que 
les autres changent. 
DEFINITION II. La portion infiniment petite dont une quantite variable augmente ou dimi- 
nue continuellement, en est appellke la Diffkrence. [I’HBpital 1696, l-2] [6] 
An an example of the first case consider y = ux2. The parameter a is a constant 
but the coordinates x and y of the parabola are variable quantities. As an illustra- 
tion of the second definition l’Hopita1 gave the diagram in Fig. 1 (Figs. l-3 are 
taken from [l’HGpital 1696, 241). 
Thus, for example, Pp is the differential of AP and Rm the differential of PM 
and so on. Furthermore the notational convention d is introduced to denote differ- 
entials. For example, if AP = x then Pp = dx. 
Before I introduce the postulates, I think two remarks are appropriate. Note 
that Definition I presupposes as a primitive of the theory the notion of a contin- 
ually increasing or decreasing quantity. A constant quantity is merely a specific 
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case of the latter; it is in fact a variable for which the differential is zero. More- 
over, Definition II postulates dx as an infinitely small quantity. But note that 
1’Hopital gave a diagram in which dx must always be represented as a finite 
increment. The pictorial representation left many, as we shall see, in doubt. 
The postulates of the work were: 
I. DEMANDE ou SUPPOSITION. On demande qu’on puisse prendre indifferemment l’une 
pour l’autre deux quantites qui ne different entr’elles que d’une quantite infiniment petite: ou 
(ce qui est la meme chose) qu’une quantite qui n’est augmentte ou diminute que d’une autre 
quantite infiniment moindre qu’elle, puisse Ctre consideree comme demeurant la meme. 
[l’Hopital 1696, 2-31 [7] 
Thus, Postulate I says that x + dx = x. 
II. DEMANDE ou SUPPOSITION. On demande qu’une ligne courbe puisse etre consideree 
comme l’assemblage d’une infinite de iignes droites, chacune infiniment petite: ou (ce qui est 
la meme chose) comme un poligone d’un nombre infini de c&es, chacun infiniment petit, 
lesquels determinent par les angles qu’ils font entr’eux, la courbure de la ligne. [See Fig. 2.1 
[l’Hopital 1696, 31 [8] 
With respect to the Cartesian tradition, the two postulates of I’Hopital repre- 
sented a concept-stretching: he stretched both the notion of equality, considered 
now as a relation between two quantities that differ by an infinitely small quantity, 
and the notion of polygon, extended now to encompass curves. 
The examples that follow give an idea of the formal manipulations that I’Hopi- 
tal’s postulates allowed. To compute the differential of a product xy 1’Hopital 
wrote 
d(xy) = (x + dx)(y + dy) - xy 
= ydx + xdy + dxdy 
= ydx + xdy, 
since by Postulate I it follows that dxdy is of a lower order of magnitude than ydx 
and xdy . 
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FIGURE 3 
Let us see now how Postulate II is used to compute the length of the subtangent 
for the parabola. Let ax = y2 be the equation of the parabola (Fig. 3). 
The problem of constructing the tangent is equivalent to the problem of finding 
the subtangent TP. Given Postulate II, we can set the following proportion: dy : dx 
= MP : PT. Hence dy : dx = y : PT. It follows that PT = ydxldy. We now use the 
differential equation for the parabola whose derivation makes use of Axiom 1: adx 
= 2ydy. This yields dx = 2ydyla. Using the last equality and substituting in the 
equation for PT, we get PT = 2y2/a, and since y’ = ax it follows that PT = 2x, 
which is the length of the subtangent. 
It is important to note here the relationship between 1’Hopital’s treatment of 
tangents and the approaches of Newton and Leibniz. One can think of tangents 
either dynamically or statically. In the first approach, stressed by Newton, the 
intuition is to consider the tangent at a point p as a limit of the secants S( p, y) for y 
approaching p. In the second conception, emphasized by Leibniz, a tangent is not 
a limiting process but a state, i.e., a position. The tangent to a point, in this second 
approach, is a straight line that cuts the curve in two points infinitely near or on 
coincident points. It is clear that the formal means needed to express these intui- 
tions differ. In the first case we deal with a limit of finite ratios. In the second case 
we need to introduce, as Leibniz did, the notion of differential increment. As the 
previous example makes clear, I’Hopital’s textbook presented the static concep- 
tion of tangents. 
4. THE BEGINNING OF THE DEBATE: ROLLE-VARIGNON, 1700-1701 
The concept-stretching proposed in I’HBpital’s book was heuristically very 
powerful but was open to attack from the point of view of rigor. L’Hopital stated 
boldly at the end of the preface to Analyse des injiniment petits: 
D’ailleurs les deux demandes ou suppositions que j’ai faites au commencement de ce Traite, 
& sur lesquelles seules il est appuye, me paroissent si Cvidentes, que je ne crois pas qu’elles 
puissent laisser aucun doute dans I’esprit des Lecteurs attentifs. Je les aurois meme pu 
demontrer facilement a la maniere des Anciens, si je ne me fusse propose d’etre court sur les 
chases qui sont deja connues. & de m’attacher principalement a celles qui sont nouvelles. 
[I’HBpital 1696, xv] 
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Leibniz and Newton had been much more circumspect in their infinitesimal 
considerations. Also, clearly for strategic purposes, they avoided explicit refer- 
ence to infinitesimals in their first public expositions of the subject. Leibniz’s 
“Nova methodus . . .” contained no reference to infinitesimals. The existence 
of a draft of the “Nova methodus . . .” (never published by Leibniz), in which 
the calculus is justified by means of infinitesimal considerations, is witness to 
Leibniz’s doubts about the rigor of the infinitesimal approach (see [Horvath 1982, 
19861). Newton, too, had been extremely careful and, in fact, in the Principiu he 
used the method of prime and last ratios in which no explicit infinitesimal consid- 
erations were made. (See [Kitcher 19731 for an analysis of the strategies ofjustifi- 
cation of the calculus in Newton.) 
There is, however, no doubt that infinitesimal considerations were heuristically 
the cutting edge of the new tool. With l’H6pital we observe a phenomenon not 
uncommon in the history of mathematics. L’Hbpital tried to stretch the admissible 
methods, lifting the heuristics of the infinitesimal calculus to a full rigorous sys- 
tem involving infinitesimals. By this I mean that l’H8pital’s textbook with its 
axiomatic structure was trying to formalize the intuitive concept of infinitesimal 
quantities and the operations regulating their use. This was a doubtful move for 
those who were unwilling to accept infinitesimal considerations as rigorous. The 
most outspoken adversary of the recognition of the infinitesimal calculus as a 
subject in rigorous mathematics was the algebraist Michel Rolle (1652-1719), who 
opened his memoir “Du Nouveau Syst$me de 1’Infini”: 
On avoit toujours regard6 la GComCtrie comme une Science exacte, & mCme comme la 
source de l’exactitude qui est rdpandue dans toutes les autres parties des Mathtmatiques. On 
ne voyoit parmi ses principes que de vtritables axiomes: tous les thCor&mes & tous les 
problCmes qu’on y  proposoit Ctoient ou solidement dCmontr&, ou capables d’une solide 
demonstration; & s’il s’y glissoit quelques propositions ou fausses ou peu certaines, aussi-t6t 
on les bannissoit de cette science. 
Mais il semble que ce caractere d’exactitude ne regne plus dans la GComCtrie depuis que 
I’on y a m&Z Je nouveau SystCme des Infiniment petits. Pour moi, je ne vois pas qu’il ait rien 
produit pour la vCritC, & il me paroit qu’il couvre souvent I’erreur. [Rolle 1703a, 3121 
Although published in the proceedings of the Parisian Academy of Sciences for 
1703, the memoir represented material used in the early stage of the debate, that 
is, during I700-1701. 
We see that Rolle formulated three distinct attacks: the calculus is not rigorous, 
it leads to mistakes, and it has not produced any new truth. The first two lines of 
attack were used by Rolle in the first part of the debate that began in July 1700 and 
lasted until the end of 1701. The last claim was made in a much stronger way in the 
second part of the debate (1702-1705). The first part of the debate consisted of a 
fight within the academy between Pierre Varignon and Rolle. Varignon (1654- 
1722), who had been working on applications of the calculus to mechanics, took 
the task of defending the new calculus. Although several memoirs were produced, 
the only published outcome of this part of the debate was the later “Du Nouveau 
Systeme . . .” The other sources available to us (see note 2) are the correspon- 
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dence between Leibniz, Johann (I) Bernoulli, and Varignon (see [Leibniz 1843- 
1863 III; Bernoulli 1988]), the Registres des Pro& verbaux des seances de I’Aca- 
demie Royale des Sciences, and a manuscript entitled “Extrait des Reponses 
faites par Mr. Varignon, en 1700 et 1701 aux objections que Mr. Rolle avait faites 
contre le calcul differentiel,” which has been ascribed by Costabel [ 19651 to the 
mathematician Charles Reyneau (1656-1728). From Reyneau’s summary it is 
clear that this first part of the debate can be further divided into two phases. The 
first phase was primarily of a foundational nature (i.e., concerned with the logical 
and metaphysical admissibility of the new calculus). The second and later phase 
was of a more technical nature. 
The first half of Reyneau’s manuscript provides valuable insight into the foun- 
dational part of the debate and gives a careful abstract of Varignon’s answers to 
Rolle. However, as Rolle’s position is only summarized in short statements, I will 
also use “Du Nouveau Systeme . . .” as a source for Rolle’s arguments. 
Rolle articulated his foundational attack in three main objections [93: 
(a) the differential calculus postulates a hierarchy of arbitrarily large and arbi- 
trarily small orders of infinities (the reader may, carefully, think of them in terms 
of higher-order differentials); 
(b) a quantity + or - its differential is made equal to the very same quantity, 
which is the same as saying that the part is equal to the whole; 
(c) sometimes the differentials are used as nonzero quantities and sometimes as 
absolute zeros. 
Note that objections (a) and (b) were grounded in the denial of the existence of 
quantities not satisfying the Archimedean axiom and in the refusal to accept a 
negation of common notion 5 in Euclid and that in (c) Rolle attacked the manipula- 
tions of the infinitesimal calculus because the denotation of the differential was 
shifted at will during the computation. For each of the previous points I will 
expose Rolle’s objections and Varignon’s answers. 
In the arguments for the first objection Rolle made two related claims. The first 
claim was that (despite 1’Hopital’s claims) the infinitesimalists had given no proof 
of the existence of these various orders of infinities. What bothered Rolle here was 
1’Hopital’s claim, made in the preface of Analyse des injiniment petits, to be able 
to give a proof of the existence of infinitesimal quantities by the way of the 
ancients (i.e., the method of exhaustion). In the paradigm of the period, had the 
above been carried through, this would have meant a truth-status for statements 
about infinitesimal quantities and not just the status of an arbitrary mathematical 
hypothesis. 
In his second claim Rolle asserted, apparently without an argument, that talking 
about differentials was nonsense, because it could be proved that differentials 
were absolute zeros. In [Rolle 1703a, 3181 he provided an argument by using the 
equation y2 = ax as an example. Using 1’Hiipital’s rules he obtained the differen- 
tial equality adx = 2ydy. Finally, under the assumption that the point (x + dx, y + 
dy), lies on the parabola, using the definition of the parabola he obtained ax + adx 
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= y* + 2ydy + dy*. Putting the three equations together and solving the system, 
using the ordinary algebraic law that subtracting equals from equals yields equals 
(whose validity Rolle took for granted), he arrived at dy* = 0 and hence dy = 0. 
Finally substitution of dy = 0 in the equation adx = 2ydy yielded dx = 0. There- 
fore, Rolle concluded, infinitesimals could not be real quantities. They were in 
fact absolute zeros. (The example works only if we systematically anchor our 
interpretation to a domain that has only zero and finite quantities.) 
Rolle’s involved argument can be made clear as follows: under the assumption 
that the same algebraic manipulations rule finite quantities and infinitesimals, 
from the equation x + dx = x, one can infer dx = 0. Rolle concluded: 
D’abord on y  voit que tous ces Infinis du premier genre tels que dx ou dy, n’ayant aucune 
&endue reelle, tous les Infinis des autres genres ne seroient aussi que des zeros absolus dans 
le calcul. Toutes ces suites infinies d’Infinis, que fournit le Systeme, ne seroient que des riens 
qu’on suppose Ctre infiniment compris dans d’autres riens. [Rolle 1703a, 3241 
Trying to respond to Rolle’s first objection, Varignon provided “proofs” of the 
existence of infinitesimally small quantities. A representative sample is the follow- 
ing “proof” reported by Reyneau. We can divide an interval of time indefinitely, 
and so this interval of time can be divided into parts infinitely small, which are 
called moments. Consider now a body A that moves with constant speed for a 
time T. The spaces traversed by this body are proportional to the times so that the 
space described in each moment is to the totality of the space S as an instant t is to 
7’. Therefore the space described (on the line) in each instant is a differential. 
Rolle’s second objection expressed his refusal to identify the whole with the 
part as in letting x + dx = x. Once again Varignon’s answer was an attempt to 
clarify the nature of infinitesimal quantities. It is interesting that Varignon ap- 
pealed to Newton’s Principia as the source for a rigorous foundation of the calcu- 
lus. Throughout his answer to Rolle, Varignon quoted verbatim Newton’s scho- 
lium to Lemma XI in Book I of the Principia. Rolle became confused, said 
Varignon, because he had not mastered the nature of differentials, which con- 
sisted in being variable and not fixed quantities and in decreasing continually until 
they reached zero, “in fluxu continua.” These quantities were considered only in 
the moment of their evanescence. This was after all, he continued, the same 
notion as Newton’s “fluxiones,” i.e., “incrementa vel decrementa momenta- 
nea.” Being considered in the moment of their evanescence they were therefore 
neither something nor absolute zeros. Reyneau summarized the point in the fol- 
lowing way: 
Mr. V.[arignon] explique que quetant euanescentiu diuisibilia, elles [les differentielles] sont 
toujours reelles et subdivisibles a I’infini jusqu’a ce qu’enfin elles ayent tout a fait cesse 
d’etre; et c’est la le seul point oh elles se changent en absolument rien. [Reyneau, 147; 
Bernoulli 1988, 3561 
Varignon did not deny that a differential was considered nothing with respect to 
its integral and he offered a proof of the statement by using the techniques of the 
ancients (i.e., exhaustion): 
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Puisque la nature des differentielles [. . .] consiste,a etre infinim’ petites et infinim’ chan- 
geantes jusqu’a zero, a n’etre que quantitates euanescentes, euanescentia diuisibiliu, elles 
seront toujours plus petites que quelque grandeur donnee que ce soit. En effet quelque 
difference qu’on puisse assigner entre deux grandeurs qui ne different que d’une differen- 
tielle, la variabilite continuelle et indefinie de cette differentielle infinim’ petite, et comme B la 
veille d’estre zero, permettra toujours d’y en trouver une moindre que la difference propode. 
Ce qui & la maniere des Anciens prouve que non obstant leur differentielle ces deux grandeurs 
peuvent etre prises pour Cgales entr’elles. [Reyneau, 147; Bernoulli I988, 3571 [IO] 
This justified, concluded Varignon, the manipulations used in the calculus. 
Insofar as they were manipulated during the computations the differentials were 
something on the verge of being zero and only at the end did%ey become zero, in 
the sense that they were considered in the moments of their evanescence, i.e., 
“non antequam evanescunt, non postea sed cum evanescunt.” This also provided 
an answer to Rolle’s third objection. 
Still, it is clear that Varignon’s answers were highly unsatisfactory. Thirty years 
later Bishop Berkeley, with much more wit than Rolle, made fun of the “ghosts of 
departed quantities. ” 
It is important to note how Varignon kept quoting Newton as the source for a 
rigorous presentation of the calculus. He took for granted that the Leibnizian 
calculus and the Newtonian calculus were equivalent and that Newton’s version 
of the calculus was rigorous. This kind of reasoning can be found later in the 
century, for example, in [Montucla 1802 III, 110-l 191. However, none of these 
assumptions could be easily justified. 
Rolle, on the other hand, was defending an approach in which there were no 
infinitesimals, and he proposed the methods of Fermat and Hudde as everything 
one needed to solve tangent problems and maxima and minima problems. 
Rolle and Varignon were unable to find a common ground on which to resolve 
their difficulties. Despite the claims of his ability to prove the existence of infini- 
tesimally small quantities by the way of the ancients (the paradigm of rigor), 
Varignon managed only to give us his inner perception of mathematical reality: a 
universe made up of variable quantities, dynamic in its essence, where fixed 
quantities were merely a special case of the former. To the finitist Rolle this was 
pure nonsense. Only by reducing differentials to zeros could he make sense of 
Varignon’s claims. Rolle’s universe was made up of finite quantities and zero; 
there was no place in it for amphibians. 
The stress on the methods of Fermat and Hudde led Rolle to challenge his 
adversary on very specific mathematical examples. I will sketch the nature of 
Rolle’s claims. Rolle claimed that the differential calculus led to mistakes. His 
general approach to the problem was to concoct examples of specific curves in 
which the individuation of maxima and minima carried through with the differen- 
tial calculus was at odds with the results given by Hudde’s rule [ 111. Varignon 
painstakingly interpreted all of Rolle’s alleged counterexamples and managed to 
show that Rolle had made several mistakes as to the nature of Hudde’s rule and 
the applications of the differential algorithm. This explains the reason for Rolle’s 







mistakes in sketching the curves he proposed. Two examples, both of which 
Reyneau reported, will suffice. 
On March 12, 1701, Rolle proposed the curve a lj3( y - b) = (x2 - 2ax + a* - 
b2)2’3 . He claimed that the infinitesimal method did not give all the maxima and 
minima provided by Hudde’s rule, and sketched the curve as in Fig. 4. Hudde’s 
rule in fact gave three ordinates that corresponded to the abscissae a, a - b, a + 
b, respectively. Rolle had applied the differential calculus by putting dy = 0, and 
that gave him a maximum at a, but he had not put dx = 0, which is also required 
for a complete application of the algorithm. Varignon showed that the application 
of the differential calculus had not been correct and then gave a correct treatment 
of the curve (whose graph is shown in Fig. 5). 
On July 2, 170 1, Rolle proposed the curve y = 2 + fix + e. He claimed 
that by using the differential calculus, one got an imaginary maximum for x = -4, 
whereas by rationalizing the equation and applying Hudde’s rule, one got the 
maximum at x = 2. The quartic obtained through the elimination of radicals is y4 - 
8y3 + 16y2 - 12xy* + 48yx - 64x + 4X’ = 0 (Fig. 6). The sketch given by Rolle is 
shown in Fig. 7. Varignon showed that the point D was only the intersection of 
two branches of the curve and that the correct application of Hudde’s rule would 
yield both the real value and the imaginary one [12]. Rolle had believed that 
Hudde’s rule provided only maxima and minima without realizing that the rule 
also gave any point in which the curve has double roots and hence all points of 
intersections. 
These unfortunate examples constructed by Rolle were one of the reasons for 
Montucla’s aversion toward Rolle. It should be noted, though, that Rolle’s attacks 
a- b a a+b 
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had the merit of raising the question of the criteria for individuating maxima and 
minima as opposed to simple points of intersection. It was only in 1706 that 
Guisnee proposed a criterion for distinguishing intersection points from maxima 
and minima [13]. Furthermore, Rolle’s objections stimulated reflection on the 
nature of Hudde’s rule, and its relationship to the methods given in the Analyse 
des injiniment petits, as is witnessed by the several letters that Leibniz and Johann 
(I) Bernoulli [Leibniz 1843-1863 III, 660-6721 exchanged on the matter and by 
Guisnee’s work. 
Let us summarize now how the problem of the foundations was seen by 
Varignon and Rolle. Varignon tried to show that infinitesimals existed. This belief 
in the existence of infinitesimals was common to all the French infinitesimalists 
and they shared it with (and probably got it from) Johann (I) Bernoulli. Their 
position can be analyzed as an attempt to provide a semantic referent to the forma1 
notion of differential. From this point of view Rolle and Varignon were closer than 
we may think. They both shared the assumption that the foundational problem 
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opponents agreed on the paradigm of rigor: Varignon tried in fact to “prove” his 
claims by using the technique of exhaustion. 
Trying to provide a semantic referent for the Leibnizian dx, Varignon made 
use of Newton and Leibniz at the same time. Although Varignon espoused the 
Leibnizian formalism he interpreted the differential dx as a process, i.e., the 
process by which a quantity x became zero (dx represented the instant in which x 
became zero). But this only shifted the problem one step further. In fact, dx 
functioned as a numerical constant, and, interpreting it as a process, Varignon’s 
approach created an asymmetry, an incongruity, between the formalism and its 
referents. (See [Petitot 1977, 4501 for further considerations on this issue.) 
5. THE PUBLIC DEBATE: EXPLAINING AND INTERVENING 
Until this point the debate had raged only within the academy. The academy 
explicitly forbade its members to make public statements concerning this debate 
despite Varignon’s request “d’avoir aussi le public pour Juge” [Bernoulli 1988, 
2541. The unwillingness of some members to take a public stand, and perhaps a 
real concern with the public image of the newly reorganized academy, contributed 
to this decision. Nonetheless, Varignon had sent the memoirs concerning the 
debate to Johann (I) Bernoulli and to Leibniz, asking them not to make any public 
mention of the fight. At the end of 1701 the academy silenced Rolle and Varignon, 
and the Abbe Bignon, president in 1701, nominated an adjudicatory commission 
composed of Gouye, Cassini, and Ph. de la Hire to judge the claims made by the 
contenders. This was the usual procedure in the academy. This commission was 
very favorable to Rolle (Gouye and Ph. de la Hire were in fact on his side) but it 
never gave a judgment. Among the reasons for not giving a judgment was that the 
situation was becoming extremely fluid. People were becoming less hostile to the 
infinitesimalist position and were slowly changing their attitudes. This was the 
case, for example, with the Abbe Gouye, who had anonymously attacked the new 
calculus in an issue of the Journal de Tre’uoux in May 1701. Reviewing an article 
by Johann (I) Bernoulli, Gouye attacked the analysis of the various orders of 
infinity and ended his attack by saying: “11 ne suffit pas en Geometric de conclure 
vray, il faut voir evidemment qu’on le conclut bien” [Gouye 1701,234]. There was 
no mention in Gouye’s article of the ongoing debate within the academy. As an 
academician, Gouye was compelled to stay silent on that point. Leibniz answered 
Gouye in the famous letter to M. Pinson written on August 29, 1701, parts of 
which were published in December by the Journal de TrPuoux. Replying to the 
attacks of Gouye, Leibniz stated: 
on n’a pas besoin de prendre l’infini icy B la rigueur, mais seulement comme lors qu’on dit 
dans 1’Optique que les rayons du soleil viennent d’un point infiniment CloignC, & ainsi sont 
estimez paralleles. Et quand il y  a plusieurs dCgrez d’infini; ou infiniment petit, C’est comme 
le Globe de la terre est estimC un point h I’Cgard de la distance des fixes, & une boule que nous 
manions est encore un point en comparaison du semidiametre du Globe de la terre. Desorte 
que la distance des fixes est un infiniment infini ou infini de l’infini par rapport au diametre de 
la boule. Car au lieu de l’infini ou de l’infiniment petit, On prend des quantitez aussi gran&s 
& aussi petites qu’il faut pour que l’erreur soit moindre que l’erreur donnke: de sorte qu’on ne 
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differe du style d’Archimede que dans les expressions qui sont plus directes dans notre 
methode & plus conformes a I’art d’inventer. [Leibniz 1701, 270-2711 
The claim of being able to recast any proof involving infinitesimals into a proof 
in the style of Archimedes, i.e., a proof using the method of exhaustion, was 
extremely suggestive but it was never developed in a completely convincing way. 
In any case, this last part of Leibniz’s letter was ignored by the anti-infinitesimal- 
ists who emphasized a literal reading of the first part of the letter. 
This declaration by Leibniz did not help the infinitesimalists fighting within the 
academy at all. If in fact, as Leibniz stated, a differential was to its variable as a 
pebble of sand to the earth, then it was clear that the differential was still a finite 
quantity and therefore the calculus could be granted only the status of an approxi- 
mation method and not that of a rigorous science. That this conclusion was drawn 
by others is confirmed by the first letter of Varignon to Leibniz (November 28, 
1701). In this letter Varignon, having identified the Abbe Galleys as the sponsor of 
the anti-infinitesimalist position, asked Leibniz to make a precise statement on 
what should be understood by “infinitesimal quantity.” This was absolutely nec- 
essary since: 
Les ennemis de votre calcul ne laissent pourtant pas d’en triompher, et de repandre cela [the 
letter to Pinson] comme une declaration nette et precise de votre sentiment sur cette mat&e. 
Je vous supplie done, Monsieur, de vouloir bien nous envoyer au plustost cette declaration 
nette et precise de votre sentiment sur cela. [Leibniz 1843-1863 IV, 901 
The disciples were asking the master to lead them through the conceptual maze 
in which they were caught. Leibniz answered Varignon’s letter on February 2, 
1702. Parts of this letter were published by the Journal des Scauans the same 
year. The position held by Leibniz in the letter may be summarized in three 
points: 
(a) There is no need to base mathematical analysis on metaphysical assump- 
tions. 
(b) We can nonetheless admit infinitesimal quantities, if not as real, as well- 
founded fictitious entities, as one does in algebra with square roots of negative 
numbers. Arguments for this position depended on a form of the metaphysical 
principle of continuity. 
(c) Or, one could organize the proofs so that the error will be always less than 
any assigned error. 
Leibniz ended by pointing out the positive nature of debates in helping sciences 
acquire better foundations. This had been the case for algebra and geometry, both 
of which had survived the attacks of their opponents. “J’espere que nostre Sci- 
ence des infinis,” Leibniz added, “ne laissera pas de subsister aussi” [Leibniz 
1843-1863 IV, 941. 
It is important to pause a second to reflect on Leibniz’s claims. Leibniz was 
trying to shift the foundational issue onto other grounds. Leibniz did not think that 
the calculus was to be justified by its “metaphysics.” Consequently, for Leibniz, 
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the problem is not “Do injinitely small quantities exist?” but “Is the use of 
infinitely small quantities in the calculus reliable?” [Bos 1980, 871. 
By this time, the use of square roots of negative numbers in algebra was a well- 
established and accepted practice, although the question of the soundness of its 
foundations was still largely unresolved. Yet Leibniz in (b) appealed to this ac- 
cepted practice as a justification for his own. Finally, I should mention the exis- 
tence of two different foundational approaches that merged in Leibniz’s letter. 
The first was related to the classical methods of proof by exhaustion; the second 
was based on a metaphysical principle of continuity. (For a detailed analysis of 
these two foundational efforts see [Bos 1974, 1980; Horvath 1982, 19861.) 
We are interested here in the consequences of this intervention by Leibniz. If 
we are to trust Varignon’s comments in a letter to Johann (1) Bernoulli (see 
[Leibniz 1843-1863 IV, 97]), Leibniz’s letter had the welcome effect of answering 
the Abbe Gouye’s doubts. These were important moves within the academy. The 
debate had not been settled yet and the infinitesimalists needed to modify an 
atmosphere that was not in their favor. Even if the letter did have this positive 
outcome, the infinitesimalists were quite unsatisfied with it. Leibniz had not ex- 
pressed any commitment to infinitesimal quantities and 1’Hopital got to the point 
of asking Leibniz not to write anything more on the matter. This is how Leibniz, in 
a letter of 1716, recalled the events: 
Quand ils [nos amis] se disputerent en France avec I’Abbe Gallois. le P&e Gouge et d’autres, 
je leur temoignai que je ne croyois point qu’il y  eQt des grandeurs veritablement infinies ni 
vcritablement infinitesimales [. . .]. Mais comme M. le Marquis de I’Hospitd croyoit que par 
la je trahissois la cause, ils me prierent de n’en rien dire. [Leibniz 1716, 500] 
We can conclude, therefore, that the infinitesimalists were deeply dissatisfied 
with the master. They had looked for a light to follow and they found that Leibniz 
had no definitive truth to give them concerning infinitesimals. Signs of this deep 
disappointment were clearly expressed by Fontenelle in his eulogy of Leibniz read 
in 1716: 
II ne faut pas dissimuler ici une chose assez singuliere. Si M. Leibnitz n’est pas de son c&C 
aussi-bien que M. Neuton 1’Inventeur du SistCme des Infiniment petits, il s’en faut infiniment 
peu. II a connu cette infinite d’ordres d’Infiniment petits toujours infiniment plus petits les uns 
que les autres, & cela dans la rigueur geometrique, & les plus grands Geometres ont adopte 
cette idee dans toute cette rigueur. II semble cependant qu’il en ait ensuite ete effraye lui- 
meme, & qu’il ait crti que ces differents ordres d’htfiniment petits n’etoient que des grandeurs 
incnmpnrubles, 8 cause de leur extreme inegalite, comme le seroient un grain de sable & le 
Globe de la Terre, la Terre & la Sphere qui comprend les Planetes. &c. Or ce ne seroit-la 
qu’une grande inegalite, mais non pas infinie, telle qu’on l’etablit dans ce Sisteme. Aussi ceux 
meme qui l’ont pris de lui n’en ont-ils pas pris cet adoucissement, qui gateroit tout. Un 
Architecte a fait un Batiment si hardi qu’il n’ose lui-m&me y  loger, & il se trouve des gens qui 
se fient plus que lui a sa solidite, qui y  logent sans crainte, &, qui plus est, sans accident. Mais 
peut-Ctre I’adoucissement n’etoit-il qu’une condescendance pour ceux dont I’imagination se 
seroit revoltee. S’il faut temperer la verite en Geometric, que sera-ce en d’autres matieres? 
[Fontenelle 1716, 114-l 151 
The attacks by Rolle had split the infinitesimalists on the problem of the founda- 
tions. 
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Although it is not my intention to discuss the complex issues related to Leib- 
niz’s philosophy of the calculus, I want to consider for a moment the deep differ- 
ence between Leibniz’s position (as perceived by the French) and the French 
infinitesimalists’ position on the problem of foundations. We have seen that the 
French took very seriously the notion of “different orders of infinity.” In their 
view this was the foundation of the building. They read Leibniz as insisting on the 
notion of incomparability. For Leibniz, they thought, it was enough to claim that a 
quantity and its differential were incomparable. The French considered this a fatal 
mistake. If in fact, they argued, two quantities were only incomparable, then their 
difference was a finite quantity and therefore a finite mistake was introduced in the 
calculus. This was not the case if dx was an infinitely small quantity. In this case, 
in fact, the mistake would be less than any finite quantity. 
This was a very narrow way to read Leibniz’s claims. Leibniz was in fact 
attempting to define a more subtle position by considering the infinitesimals as 
well-founded fictions. By reading Leibniz literally rather than metaphorically on 
the sand and globe metaphor, the French mathematicians were unable to under- 
stand Leibniz’s more complex position. In effect, Leibniz was proposing a sophis- 
ticated “formalistic” foundation for his algorithm. However, by considering the 
infinitesimals as well-founded fictions, he was introducing a gap between the 
formal apparatus and the referents. We can say that Leibniz’s system was based 
on a “subversion” of the semantics in favor of a consistent formalism. This could 
somehow justify his claims that, linguistically, the opposition finite/infinite could 
be easily relativized. 
& il se trouve que les Regles du fini reussissent dans l’infini, comme s’il y  avoit des Atomes 
(c’est-a-dire, des Clemens assignables de la matiere,) quoy qu’il n’y en ait point, la matiere 
&ant actuellement sous-divisible saris fin; & que vice uersa les Regles de I’infini reussissent 
dans le fini, comme s’il y  avoit des infiniment petits Metaphysiques, quoy qu’on n’en ait point 
besoin, & que la division de la matiere ne parvienne jamais a des parcelles infiniment petites. 
C’est parce que tout ce gouverne par raison, & qu’autrement il n’y auroit point de science ny 
de Regle; ce qui ne seroit point conforme avec la nature du souverain Principe. [Leibniz 1702, 
1861 
The Parisian mathematicians tried to provide a concrete reference to Leibniz’s 
formalism. However, at this state of the art, the attempt was hopeless; since finite 
quantities and infinitesimals were assumed to be ruled by the same algebraic laws, 
nothing could prevent the inference from x + dx = x to dx = 0. Jakob Bernoulli 
had earlier warned against the use of the usual algebraic laws, such as “if equals 
are subtracted from equals, the results are equal,” in computations involving 
infinitesimal quantities. By not addressing the problem explicitly, l’H8pital gave 
his opponents the opportunity for a strong criticism of the Anafyse des injiniment 
petits. 
6. ROLLE-SAURIN, 1702-1703: THE SECOND PART OF THE DEBATE 
This second part of the debate was fought publicly in the Journal des Sqauans, 
which had always been very open to the academicians. On April 3, 1702, the 
Journal des Sqauans published Rolle’s article, “Regles et remarques, pour le 
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probleme general des Tangentes.” In this article Rolle proposed some new rules 
for solving tangent problems. The methods given so far, in Rolle’s opinion, were 
insufficient to discover all the tangents to geometric curves. Rolle emphasized that 
the rules he was proposing had their origin in ordinary analysis (as opposed to the 
new analysis). The article ended with a challenge clearly addressed to the infini- 
tesimalists. Rolle used various examples showing, he claimed, that when we have 
more than one tangent at a given point on a curve (corresponding, for example, to 
a point of self-intersection of the curve), the “most-used” methods were no longer 
sufficient. One of Rolle’s examples was again the curve 
(A) y4 - 8y3 - 12xy* + 4&y + 4x2 - 64x + 16y2 = 0. 
Although Rolle never mentioned Varignon or Anulyse des injiniment petits, the 
article was a clear challenge to the infinitesimalists. The reply to Rolle was written 
by a protege of l’Hopita1, Joseph Saurin (1659-1737), who was not yet an acade- 
mician. He interpreted Rolle’s article as a direct attack against the infinitesimal 
calculus. Rolle had claimed (we are already familiar with his strategy) that in the 
case of multiple points the new analysis would not give the classical results. It was 
true that, for example, in (A) dyldx becomes indeterminate for x = 2. Saurin, 
using I’Hopital’s rule, was able to show for some of the cases how the methods 
given by I’Hopital’s book were perfectly fine. He then accused Rolle of plagiariz- 
ing I’Hopital’s methods by using notational variants of them and attacked Rolle 
with a purely ad hominem argument: “En lisant cet Article, on sent un Auteur, qui 
chagrin de ne pouvoir se passer du Calcul differentiel qu’il n’aime pas, t&che de 
profiter ce qu’il peut y avoir de commun entre ce Calcul & la methode de M. de 
Fermat pour le confondre entierement avec cette methode” [Saurin 1702, 5311. 
Finally, Saurin challenged Rolle to apply his methods to mechanical curves. Once 
again the successful applications of the infinitesimal calculus were playing a major 
role in its acceptance as a rigorous method. 
From this point, the debate became more personal and political. Each faction 
used any means at its disposal to create the conditions for its victory. For exam- 
ple, the debate went on in the Journal des SCavans, which Gouye and Bignon 
directed in 1702. Whereas Rolle’s article was published without cuts, Bignon had 
cut Saurin’s answer. Here is the bitter comment of Varignon taken from a letter to 
Johann (I) Bernoulli written in the summer of 1702: 
Quant a ce que vous luy [I’Hopital] aviez envoye pour Ctre publit darts le Journal de Scavans. 
je vous diray qu’on n’y met plus du tout de mathematiques depuis la lettre de M. Leibnitz que 
j’y fis inserer il y a 5 ou 6 mois. le party etant pris de n’y en plus mettre a moins que ce ne soit 
dans des Journaux extraordinaires. pour lesquels obtenir il faut avoir de quoy les remplir. 
outre qu’on ne les accorde encore qu’avec peine a cause du peu de gens qui en achetent. C’est 
pour cela que M. le Marquis de L’hopital avec tout son credit a eu touttes les peines du 
monde a en obtenir un pour publier la Reponse qu’il a fait faire a M. Rolle par un nomme Mr. 
Saurin; encore M. I’Abbe Bignon (qui a aussi la direction de ce Journal comme Neveu de M. 
le Chancelier, et qui n’avoit (dit-il) recu I’Ecrit de M. Rolle que parce qu’il n’y paroissoit 
aucune contestation) a-t-il voulu qu’on en retranchast tout ce qu’il y avoit de personnel: ce 
qui a tout a fait defigure cette Reponse. [Bernoulli 1988. 3241 
We can see therefore that the editorial policy of the 
favored Rolle over Saurin. 
directors of the Journal had 
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Rolle attacked again in 1703 and in 1704 (see [Rolle 1703b, 17041) with another 
memoir on the inverse of tangents (i.e., the integral calculus). Saurin did not 
immediately answer these attacks but another devoted infinitesimalist decided to 
join the battle: he was Fontenelle, the perpetual secretary of the academy. 
7. FONTENELLE AND THE EULOGY OF L’H&‘ITAL 
Fontenelle had been elected perpetual secretary of the academy in 1697. Among 
his duties was the yearly compilation of the Histoire et MPmoires de I’Acadkmie 
Royale des Sciences. He also delivered public speeches representing the acad- 
emy, including the eulogies of the deceased academicians. Since 1694, he had 
been very close to the group led by Malebranche. 
Until this point Fontenelle, although on the side of the infinitesimalists, had 
publicly spoken of the debate only in a small note published in the Histoire of the 
academy for the year 1701. One may question the editorial policy of Fontenelle on 
the subject: his short note did not do justice to a debate that occupied the academy 
for 2 years-the Registres des Pro&s Verbaux of the academy for 1700 and 1701 
are filled almost entirely with these debates (see [Blay 19861 for extensive quota- 
tions from the Registres). Still, the note at least gave a hint of the existence of a 
true problem concerning the foundations of the infinitesimal calculus: “11 saura 
bien, si la nouvelle Geometric n’est pas solide, se retracter de la grande vogue 
qu’il commence a lui donner, & y demeler, avec le terns les erreurs qu’il n’y a pas 
encore appercues” [Fontenelle 1701, 891. But on the whole the note was very 
flattering to the new system proposed by l’HBpita1. In particular, 1’Hopital’s si- 
lence during the debate was carefully explained to avoid the impression that 
1’Hopital had any fears concerning his calculus. Fontenelle himself had not yet 
taken an official stand. 
In 1704 the debate was at its peak. On February 2 1’Hopital died, and on April 2 
Fontenelle read the “Eloge de M. le Marquis de 1’Hopital.” In this eulogy, the 
differential calculus was described as the “sublime geometric. ” L’HBpital was 
emphatically described as possessing a map to the “Pays de 1’Infini” and as 
knowing its most remote paths: 
M. de I’Hopital resolut de communiquer saris reserve les tresors caches de la nouvelle 
Geometric, & il le fit dans le fameux Livre de I’Ann(~w des I~finirnent petits, qu’il publia en 
1696. La, furent d&oil& tous les secrets de I’lnfini Geometrique, & de I’lnfini de I’lnfini; en 
un mot, de tous ces differens ordres d’lnfinis, qui s’elevent les uns au-dessus des autres, & 
forment I’Edifice le plus Ctonnant & le plus hardi que I’Esprit humain ait jamais ose imaginer. 
[Fontenelle 1704a, 1311 
Given these words it is difficult to imagine that the very foundations of this 
building were still under violent attack within the academy. But Fontenelle, ad- 
dressing the opposition, went even further: 
. Aussi cet Ouvrage a-t-il CtC recu avec un applaudissement universel: car I’applaudissement 
est universel, quand on peut tres-facilment compter dans toute I’Europe les suffrages qui 
manquent, & il doit toujours en manquer quelques-uns aux chases nouvelles & originales, 
sur-tout quand elles demandent a Ctre bien entendues. Ceux qui remarquent les Cvenemens de 
I’Histoire des Sciences, savent avec quelle avidite I’Analyse des Infiniment petits a CtC saisie 
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par tous les Geometres naissans, a qui I’ancienne & la nouvelle methode sont indifferentes, & 
qui n’ont d’autre interet que celui d’etre instruits. Comme le dessein de I’Auter avoit CtC 
principalement de faire des Mathematiciens, & de jetter dans les esprits les semences de la 
haute Geometric, il a eu le plaisir de voir qu’elles y  fructifoient tous les jours, & que des 
Problemes reserves autrefois a ceux qui avoient vieilli dans les Cpines des Mathematiques, 
devenoient des coups d’essai de jeunes gens. Apparemment la revolution deviendra encore 
plus grande, & il se seroit trouve avec le temps autant de Disciples qu’il y  efit eu de Mathe- 
maticiens. [Fontenelle 1704a, 1331 
The opposition’s voice was silenced by the universal recognition given to l’H& 
pital, as if truth were just a matter of universal agreement. The message was all 
too clear: those who criticized the differential calculus did not understand it. The 
reference to Rolle and Galloys was very explicit in the comparison made between 
those who were devoted to the ancients and those who were devoted to learning, 
regardless of modern or ancient methods. We see how easily Fontenelle skipped 
over the fundamental issue of the foundations of the new algorithm. This problem 
had not been settled and Eontenelle knew this all too well. He himself was work- 
ing on a book that would have provided “la vrai metaphysique” of the infinitesi- 
mal calculus. 
Nevertheless, the need to destroy the anti-infinitesimalist opposition was too 
important. No mention was made here of any foundational problem. Reducing the 
critiques of the noninfinitesimalists to pure ignorance, Fontenelle was taking a 
very definite stand on the ongoing debate within the academy. To avoid the 
suspicion that my reading is a superimposition on the text, I quote another source 
to show that Fontenelle’s words had a much clearer and stronger meaning in the 
context in which they were originally uttered: 
Mr. I’Abbe Bignon en donnant a Mr. de Fontenelle les loiianges qu’il meritoit pour les deux 
beaux discours qu’il venoit de prononcer, luy dit qu’il avoit fait si hautement I’eloge de la 
Geometrie des infiniments petits. qu’apres ceia on ne pouvoit douter qu’il n’en Mt le partisan 
declare. Que cependant ceux qui n’etoient point initiez dans les mysteres de cette nouvelle 
Geometrie Ctoient effrayez d’entendre qu’il y  cut des infinis, des infinis d’infinis & des infinis 
plus grands ou plus petits que d’autres infinis; parce qu’ils ne voyent que le comble de 
I’edifice saris scavoir sur quel fondement il Ctoit appuye. II exhorta done Mr. de Fontenelle 
qui travaille a des Elemens du calcul differentiel de les donner au phitot au public, afin de 
convaincre tout le monde de la solidite de cette sublime Geometrie a qui il venoit de donner 
tant d’eloges. [Journal de Trhwx 1704, 1016-10171 
It is clear that the eulogy of I’Hopital was perceived as an open declaration of 
partisanship on Fontenelle’s part. Not only did he use his lofty position to make 
public statements concerning the truth or falsity of the anti-infinitesimalists’ 
claims -a practice that one may clearly question-he went further. The first page 
of the Histoke et MPmoires de I’Acadkmie des Sciences for 1704 had the following 
‘ ‘Avertissement”: 
On a imprime dans les Memoires de 1703, page 312, un Ecrit de M. Rolle, intitule, Du 
nouveau Systeme de I’lnfini. Les Reflexions que diverses personnes ont faites sur cet Ecrit, 
sur les principes qui y  sont avances, & sur le consequences qu’on en pourroit tirer, obligent a 
declarer que quoqu’il se trouve parmi les autres Ouvrages destines a I’impression par I’Aca- 
demie, son intention n’a jamais CtC d’adopter rien de ce qui s’y peut trouver. [Fontenelle 
1704b] 
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This official condemnation of Rolle’s memoir, a flagrant contradiction of the 
spirit of the academy, raised several doubts concerning the alleged impartiality of 
this institution. For us the condemnation is important because it showed that 
Fontenelle (and Bignon) had already made a decision on the debate. This sheds 
light on the composition of the two groups and, as we shall see, on the composi-’ 
tion of the adjudicatory commission nominated in 1705. 
8. ROLLE-SAURIN, 1705: REPRISE AND THE PEACE OF 
THE INFINITELY SMALL 
Saurin had not responded to the attacks made by Rolle in 1703 and 1704. Rolle’s 
flush of papers and his boasts could have given the impression that he had silenced 
his adversaries. However, on April 23, 1705, Saurin attacked Rolle again. By then 
the debate had completely degenerated into mere invective. Some short quota- 
tions will give an idea of the level of these last articles. In the above-mentioned 
article Saurin wrote: “Qui s’imagineroit, qu’avec cette assurance, il ne va qu’a 
t&tons, & ne parle qu’au hazard ?” [Saurin 1705a, 2521. Replying on June 2, Rolle 
called Saurin “un pitoyable geometre” [Rolle 1705a, 3181. The final article in this 
long debate was written by Rolle and published on July 30, 1705 (see [Rolle 
1705b]). Rolle kept accusing I’Hopital of plagiarizing the classical algebraic meth- 
ods in his Analyse des inJiniment petits but on the whole there was little new 
theoretical or philosophical content to this last part of the debate. Meanwhile, 
Saurin was repeatedly imploring the academy to give a final judgment. The feeling 
that the academy would soon heed his calls and nominate a commission for this 
purpose only added urgency to the exchange. Leibniz was very annoyed about the 
whole situation. He thought it important to get a favorable judgment from the 
academy and a public condemnation of Rolle. Writing to Varignon, he said: 
J’ay receu enfin le Journal du 13me d’Avril de cette annee. qu’un Suedois m’a apporte, et j’ay 
vu que je n’avois pas besoin d’autre instruction. ny de beaucoup de discussion, pour exam- 
iner ce qui est conteste entre M. Saurin et M. Rolle. C’est pourquoy, pour satisfaire a vostre 
desk, et au sien, quoyque d’ailleurs je n’aime pas les contestations, je vous envoye le papier 
cyjoint, esperant qu’il sera conforme & vostre intention. La mienne seroit que saris le publier 
on le communiquat a M. I’ Abbe Bignon [. . .I. 
Peutestre qu’elle le portera a terminer selon la justice une dispute scandaleuse du caste de 
celuy qui fait des objections les plus frivoles qui se puissent voir, en I’obligeant de reconnois- 
tre qu’on a satisfait sur cet article. Je pense meme a en Ccrire aussi a M. I’AbbC Gallois et a 
adresser la lettre pour luy i M. I’AbbC Bignon. Si cela ne servira de rien, il faut abandonner la 
pensee de faire rendre justice B M. Saurin et a nostre calcul par I’Academie. et nous tacherons 
de ramasser des jugemens des autres. [Leibniz 1843-1863 IV, 127-1281 
At the end of 1705 the Abbe Bignon nominated a commission, including himself, 
Ph. de la Hire, Galloys, Fontenelle, and Cassini, to provide an official judgment 
on the whole affair. Varignon’s testimony is important in assessing the political 
composition of the commission: 
Vostre lettre du 26 Julliet dernier me fut rendue sur la fin du meme mois. Je fus aussi tost 
porter a M. I’AbbC Bignon celle que vous m’adressiez pour lui, avec celle que son paquet 
contenoit aussi pour M. I’AbbC Galloys. M. I’Abbe Bignon lut la sienne sur le champ, et il me 
dist qu’il ne manqueroit pas de vous faire reponse, et qu’en attendant j’eusse a vous asseurer 
HM 16 METAPHYSICS OF THE CALCULUS 243 
qu’il avait desja donne des ordres pour terminer la dispute d’entre M. Sam-in et M. Rolle; que 
pour Juges avec luy, il avait nomme M. Cassini, M. de la Hire, M. I’AbbC Galloys et M. de 
Fontenelle, qui est le seul de ceux qui sont pour les infiniment petits, qui n’ait pas Cte t&use. 
Pour nous, nous n’avons r&use personne, non pas meme M. I’AbbC Galleys, tout ennemi 
declare qu’il est de ce calcul, ny M. de la Hire, quelque livre qu’il soit a M. I’Abbe Galloys: 
M. Saurin a seulement demand6 que le jugement de chacun de ces Mrs. fust rendu public, 
pour retenir les ennemis du calcul par la crainte d’exposer leur reputation. [Leibniz 1843- 
1863 IV, 131-1321 
It is clear that the fight was far from being decided. 
The academy made its decision public in January 1706. Rolle was asked to 
conform better to the regulations of the academy and Saurin was “renvoye a son 
bon coeur.” Fontenelle referred in 1719 to this decision as the “paix des infini- 
ment petits.” Leibniz and Johann (I) Bernoulli were of course dissatisfied; Leib- 
niz considered the judgment “magis morale quam mathematicum” [Leibniz 1843- 
1863 III, 7941. But it is clear that given the composition of forces within the 
academy no other verdict would have been possible. 
The judgment stopped Rolle’s attacks, and the death of Galloys in 1707 put an 
end to the opposition. Varignon wrote to Johann (I) Bernoulli (November 10, 
1706): 
J’ecris a M. Hermann que M. Rolle est enfin converti: il vous dira comment il m’est l’est venu 
a marquer et a M. de Fontenelle; il I’a aussi marque au P. Malebranche, disant qu’on I’avoit 
pousse a faire ce qu’il a fait contre les infiniment petits, et qu’il en etoit fache. . . . [Male- 
branche 1958-1968 XIX, 7391 
We can speculate about Rolle’s change. He had alienated himself from the rest 
of the mathematical community. He probably thought it best to excuse himself 
and accept a dignified peace. I cannot help but quote Leibniz’s comment regarding 
Rolle’s alleged conversion: “Plus gaudii est in coelo nostro geometric0 ex uno 
peccatore converse, quam ex decem justis” [Leibniz 1843-1863 III, 8111. What is 
certain, however, is that Rolle never did convince himself of the soundness of the 
infinitesimal calculus. Writing to Leibniz in 1708, Varignon mentioned that Rolle 
was still making adverse comments: “J’apprend cependant que M. Rolle ne laisse 
pas de decrier encore sourdament ce calcul par le monde” [Leibniz 1843-1863 IV, 
1671. 
The death of Galloys and the withdrawal of Rolle marked the final victory of the 
infinitesimal calculus on the continent. In his preface to the bmens de la ge’ome’- 
trie de l’infini Fontenelle could finally boast: “Malgre tout cela 1’Infini a triomphe, 
& s’est empare de toutes les hautes speculations des Geometres. Les Infinis ou 
Infiniment petits de tous les ordres sont aujourd’hui egalement etablis, il n’y a pas 
plus deux partis dans 1’Academie” [Fontenelle 1727, preface]. The battle had not 
been an easy one. 
CONCLUSION 
I made two claims in my introduction. It is now time to comment on them. 
(a) There is no doubt that the withdrawal of Rolle and the death of Galloys 
marked the complete victory of the infinitesimal calculus in France, a victory 
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sought with constant appeal to the authority of the most famous geometers and to 
the increasing success of the differential algorithm in solving problems inaccessi- 
ble to the previous algebraic techniques. We must be amazed at the effort spent by 
the infinitesimalists on winning their battle. The foundational issue remained un- 
clear but the analysts pushed ahead, as Kline would say, “with vigor but without 
rigor. ’ ’ 
(b) My second claim concerned the philosophical and mathematical significance 
of Rolle’s objections. As to the mathematical significance, although flawed by 
several mistakes Rolle’s attacks had the merit of pushing research toward areas 
not yet completely understood: witness the work by Saurin in the next 2 decades 
on singularities on curves and Guisnee’s work on Hudde’s and Fermat’s rules. As 
to the philosophical significance, the opposition finite/infinite is one of the long- 
standing issues in the philosophy of mathematics. Rolle addressed the problems of 
rigor in mathematics and of the acceptability of infinitary mathematics. This 
forced the infinitesimalists to address explicitly the foundational problem, and, as 
we have seen, they were far from having conclusive answers. 
Rolle’s criticisms also foreshadowed Bishop Berkeley’s more famous attacks 
against the fluxional and the differential calculus. Several questions could be 
asked about the relationship between the early criticisms of the infinitesimal cal- 
culus (of Rolle, Nieuwentijt, Cluver, etc.) and the successive ones. For the mo- 
ment I will limit myself to some brief remarks about the similarities and dissimilar- 
ities between Rolle’s criticisms and Berkeley’s Analyst while referring the reader 
to [Blay 19861 for a more thorough analysis. It is quite interesting to find that 
Rolle’s three main objections are raised in the Analyst. In particular, Berkeley’s 
paragraphs 6 and 7 contain a critique of the existence and conceivability of differ- 
entials, and paragraph 18 contains an attack on the use of dx both as a quantity and 
as an absolute zero. Although the motivations for Rolle’s attacks and Berkeley’s 
criticisms differed, the two agreed on a number of points and on an explicit 
finitism. For Rolle this finitism was embedded in the Cartesian refusal to admit 
infinitary mathematics as a rigorous discipline; for Berkeley, more explicit episte- 
mological considerations accounted for the finitist commitment. 
I must also remark on the different logic in the strategies employed by Rolle and 
Berkeley. Rolle thought that the wrong principles of the analysis were bound to 
produce falsities; Berkeley never questioned the results of the calculus and pro- 
posed his theory of double mistakes to explain how one could, through several 
errors, arrive “though not at science yet at truth” [Berkeley 1734, 781. 
Finally, it is my opinion that Rolle’s position within the academy made his 
attacks much more dangerous for the French infinitesimalists than Berkeley’s 
attacks were for the British mathematicians. Moreover, Rolle’s challenge was 
extremely radical, as Fontenelle points out: “il y a certainement encore des 
difficult& a eclaircir dans le Systeme de la nouvelle Geometrie; mais on parloit de 
renverser le Systeme total” [Fontenelle 1719, 981. 
Rolle provoked inside the academy a foundational “crisis’‘-according to Her- 
bert Mehrtens’s definition, a “phenomenon [whereby] in a given mathematical 
community- for whatever reasons -the common commitment of the groups are 
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questioned and, consequently, the stability of this social system is at risk” [Mehr- 
tens 1976,303]. The means to solve this crisis ranged from clarifications to author- 
ity, from persuasion to proof, from dubious editorial policies to public condemna- 
tions. 
Once again we must reach the conclusion that mathematics and its development 
are due to human efforts and not only to the soundness of the ideas involved. 
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NOTES 
1. For some recent work in this direction see [Giorello 1985, chap. vii]. 
2. When this paper was already in its editorial stage I came across the just-published edition of the 
second volume of the epistolary of Johann (I) Bernoulli [Bernoulli 19881. This volume contains several 
letters exchanged between J. (I) Bernoulli and Varignon that are relevant to the debate and were not 
included in [Fedel 19321. The same volume (Annexe IV, pp. 351-376) contains an edited text by J. 
Peiffer of the manuscript [Reyneau]. Although I had used the original manuscript, I have subsequently 
changed the quotes from [Reyneau] to conform to [Bernoulli 19881. In addition, the quotes from [Fedel 
I9321 have been changed to [Bernoulli 19881. In the introduction to Reyneau’s text, Peiffer also refers 
to the article [Blay 19861, which had escaped my attention, in which the foundational aspect of the 
Rolle-Varignon debate is emphasized. By comparing Rolle’s and Berkeley’s critiques, Blay shows 
that the technical success of the differential calculus in the first 3 decades of the 18th century brought a 
change in the “style of criticisms” leveled against the differential calculus. Since Blay uses material 
from the Rolle-Varignon debate, there is some overlap between Section 4 of this paper and the first 
half of Blay’s article. Blay’s insightful article must be recommended for the extensive use of the 
Registres des Pro&s Verbaux des Seances de I’AcadCmie Royale des Sciences (in particular, vols. I9 
and 20), where one can find the second, third, and fifth memoirs by Rolle and the first four replies by 
Varignon. The archival sources used by Blay enrich but do not alter the general picture of the Rolle- 
Varignon debate as conveyed by Reyneau. Thus, I have not found it necessary to modify Section 4, 
although I refer the reader to Blay’s paper where appropriate. 
3. In this paper all quotations appear in their original form; no attempt has been made 
the spelling or to resolve many of the inconsistencies in spelling of the original text. 
to modernize 
4. The reader 
branchists.” 
is referred to [Malebranche 1958-1968 XX] for detailed biographies of the “male- 
5. Rolle was an algebraist, Galloys ( I632- 1707) had done some work 
de la Hire ( 1640- I7 18) had done important work on conic sections. 
on ancient geometry, and Ph. 
6. Since these definitions are central to what follows, I provide the translation given in [Struik 1967, 
3131: 
DEFINITION I. Variable quantities are those that continually increase or decrease; 
constant or standing quantities are those that continue the same while others vary. 
DEFINITION 2. The infinitely small part whereby a variable 
creased or decreased is called the differential of that quantity. 
7. “POSTU LATE 1. Grant that two quantities, whose differences is an infinitely small quantity, may 
be taken (or used) indifferently for each other: or (which is the same thing) that a quantity, which is 
and 
quantity is continually in- 
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increased or decreased only by an infinitely small quantity, may be considered as remaining the same” 
[Struik 1967, 3141. 
8. “POSTULATE 2. Grant that a curve line may be considered as the assemblage of an infinite number 
of infinitely small right lines: or (which is the same thing) as a polygon of an infinite number of sides, 
each of an infinitely small length, which determine the curvature of the line by the angles they make 
with each other” [Struik 1967, 3141. 
9. See [Reyneau 144; Bernoulli 19883521 and letter 55 from Varignon to J. (I) Bernoulli in [Bernoulli 
1988, 2551. 
10. This interesting passage is clearly related to Leibniz’s 
calculus in the spirit of the exhaustion method (cf. Section 5). 
attempts to give a justification of the 
11. Descartes, in the Geometric, had given a method for finding the normal at a point of an arbitrary 
curve. This method rested essentially on the determination of a double root of a suitable equation 
obtained from the data of the problem. The difficulty remained in finding the double root. It was Johann 
Hudde (in 1659) who published a rule for determining double roots of an arbitrary polynomial. The 
generalization to an arbitrary algebraic curve x c;,x’yJ = 0 was given by Sluse (published in 1672). The 
letter by Hudde was published in the second edition of the Latin translation of Descartes’ GPomPtrie. 
The rule can be described as follows. Starting from an arbitrary polynomial P(x) = X:=0 a,x’ and an 
arbitrary arithmetical progression a, a + k, a + 2k, . . . , a + nk, if we multiply aOx by u, a Ix I by a -t 
k, and so on, we obtain another polynomal P*(x) = xyZo u,(u + ik)x;. Hudde asserted that if c is a 
double root of P(x) = 0 then c is a root of P*(x) = 0. (Note that for a = 0 and k = 1 we have P*(x) = 
P(x), where P’(x) is the derivative of P(x).) This rule can be used to determine points of maxima and 
minima. A maximum or a minimum value M of P(x) occurs, as Fermat had already noted, at a double 
root of the equation P(x) - M = 0, and hence at a root of (P(x) - M)* = 0. 
12. [Blay 1986, 237-2401 contains an extensive discussion of the first example. For Figs. 4-7 and the 
discussion of the previous two examples, I followed [Bernoulli 1988, 363, 364,277; Fleckenstein 1946, 
130-131; Costabel 1965, 20-221. The labeling in Figs. 4 and 5 does not follow the original one. 
13. The rule for finding maxima and minima given in the Anulyse des injiniment petits required that 
one set dy = 0 and dx = 0. Guisnee’s criterion stated that when from both these suppositions one 
obtained the same finite values for x and y  (i.e., both conditions determined the same point of the 
curve), then that point was an intersection point and not a true point of maximum or minimum. 
“Lorsque dans l’une & dans l’autre supposition de dx = 0 (qui est la meme chose que dy. = m), & de 
dx = 03 (qui est la meme chose que dy = 0), l’on trouvera, pour chacune des deux coordonnees x & y, 
les memes valeurs en termes finis ou nuls; on sera assure que la Courbe, dont la nature est exprimee 
par l’equation sur laquelle on opere, a un noeud au point ou les coordonnees ont les valeurs 
trouvees” [Guisnee 1706, 341. 
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